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Liberal Globalization and Peripheral Justice 
LIBERAL GLOBALIZATION AND PERIPHERAL JUSTICE 
Weigang Chen 
Abstract 
The increasing salience of cultural conflicts in the post-Cold War era brings the problem of 
peripheral justice, defined as the equal attainment of social justice, to the center of current 
debates on globalization. Specifically, they force us to directly confront the toughest 
challenge posed by the Weberian tradition: If the principles of justice and equality are 
beyond the peculiarity of the Occidental civilization, how then may we give a full explanation 
as to why in the West-and only in the West-the ideal of public reasoning by private people 
has been materialized? The present study seeks to address this fundamental challenge by 
drawing on the Marxist tradition of public hegemony developed by Confucian Marxists and 
Gramsci. I argue that at the core of the problem of peripheral justice is an intrinsic linkage 
between Eurocentricism and the liberal paradigm of "civil society." The prospect of equal 
justice, therefore, hinges on the development of a new conception of the "social" that 
reverses the liberal interpretation of the relationship between bourgeois subjectivity and the 
"social" and derives from the primacy of the ethical life for social formation. 
The Liberal Empire or Peripheral Justice? 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 stimulated high aspirations for the universal 
benefits of democratic reasoning and market-oriented thinking (Held, 1993 p. 249). Liberal 
democracy was proclaimed as the "end of history"--1:hat is, "the final form of human 
government" (Fukuyama, 1989, p. 3). This sense of exhilaration was most manifest in the 
phenomenal rise of a variety of theories of liberal globalization that celebrated a new epoch 
of human history in which, as a result of the erosion of the division between industrialized 
center/non-industrialized peripheral regions, transnational corporations and global 
institutions of liberalism would eventually supplant traditional nation-states as the principal 
agents of world society (Ohmae, 1995, p. 5; Amin, 1997, pp. 2-3). Throughout the 1990s, 
this perception was used by both neo-liberals and neo-Marxists as the cornerstone of their 
analyses of the post-Cold War world order (Held et aI, 1999, p. 3; Hirst and Thompson, 
1999). 
But even before the ink was dry on paper, these arguments had already been made 
obsolete by the emerging trends in the post-Cold War world. Since the mid-1990s, it has 
become increasingly evident that what has replaced the rivalry between the Communist East 
and the West is not the advance of a global liberal civilization but, on the contrary, the 
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growing fragmentation of nations into cultural blocs and ethnic enclaves. Indeed, one does 
not need to embrace Samuel Huntington's theory of the civilizational clash to recognize the 
increasing salience of cultural and ethnic conflict in global politics today (Huntington, 1996). 
Recent major developments in the non-Western world, from the spectacular growth of 
Islamic fundamentalism in Muslim countries to the rapid ascendancy of Confucian 
nationalism in East Asia, I all demonstrate indisputably that culture and cultural identities 
have become the driving force in the current age of globalization. 
Beneath the intensification of cultural and religious conflicts in today's world is a 
perennial question that has haunted social analysts ever since the nineteenth century: Why 
does liberal democracy triumph in the West but become a standard recipe for social and 
economic disasters throughout the peripheral world (de Soto, 2000)? This dilemma of 
peripheral liberal deformation has found its most powerful expression in our world today. 
The eager tum of former communist and developing nations to the free-market economy and 
liberal democracy has not ushered in an unequivocal flowering of capitalism. Instead, the 
imposition of the liberal orthodoxy, including privatization of the public sector, the 
emasculation of the state apparatus, and the insistence on electoral reform, has directly 
contributed to anarchy, civil wars, and economic stagnation (Hoogvelt, 1997, p. 175). The 
disastrous social and political integration in these countries contrasts sharply with the 
remarkable economic growth of East Asian countries, whose rapid rise into the epicenter of 
global capitalism has stemmed precisely from their effective implementation of a 
deliberately illiberal, de-Westernized, and state-centered strategy of development. 2 
Such a striking contrast, as Fukuyama recently concedes, renders it abundantly clear 
that the powerlessness and poverty in today's world are due not to the excessive power of 
nation-states, but to their weakness. "The solution is not to undermine sovereignty but to 
build stronger states in the developing world" (Fukuyama, 2004). In this regard, 
globalization defined as the expansion of capitalism to non-Western regions presupposes and 
simply relies on a structural differentiation between Western democratic states and peripheral 
developmental states. Simply put, globalization is actually the new manifestation of the 
deepening of the core/periphery polarization. 
I In 1993, Hanoi published, at great expense, a romanized Vietnamese translation (in fifteen volumes 
with almost eight thousand pages) of "The Imperially Authorized Compendium ofInstitutions and Institutional 
Cases of the Great South" ("The Great South" was the Vietnamese imperial name for Vietnam, adopted in the 
late 1830s). The "Compendium ofInstitutions" had been compiled originally in classical Chinese by senior 
mandarins of the Vietnamese court at Hue in the I 840s. It was supposed to be an encyclopedic handbook of the 
Vietnamese government on the principles of bureaucratic Confucianism. The communist state translators of 
this voluminous work bragged of their determination to ensure that libraries, schools, cultural agencies, and 
even every family library aU over Vietnam would obtain copies of their translation. The translation and 
impressive popularization of this massive work in the 1990s clearly demonstrates a powerful renewal ofthe 
national interest in the country's pre-colonial Confucian legacy (Woodside, 1997, pp. 68-69). 
2 For a more detailed analysis of the dilemma of peripheral liberal deformation and its manifestations 
in the post-Cold War world, see my article "Peripheral Justice: The Marxist Tradition of Public Hegemony and 
Its Implications in the Age of Globalization," positions: east asia cultures critique 13/1 (2005), forthcoming. 
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It is in this paradoxical suture of economic globalization and political polarization 
that we may discern the real source of the most profound contradictions of today's world 
order. Due to the persistence of peripheral liberal deformation, de-liberalization or the state-
centered model of development constitutes an indispensable precondition for the upward 
mobility of a peripheral nation within the capitalist world system controlled by Western 
powers. The irony is that the more a peripheral nation achieves economic success within the 
world system, the more it is exposed to the dictation of the global market regulated by liberal 
norms, and the more it is forced to give up its only means of survival within the system--the 
ethical State. Not surprisingly, the past decades have witnessed a burgeoning movement 
across the peripheral world that seeks to "Confucianize" or "Islamize" modernity by 
effectively resisting Western values, institutions, and practices (Kepel, 1994). 
An appropriate point of reference for considering the dilemma of peripheral liberal 
deformation may be found in the idea of the primacy of justice as explicated by Rawls. 
Social justice, defined as the basic structure of society, presupposes the existence of a pre-
political state of nature and the possibility of a public perspective shared by the contracting 
parties, which, ironically, may least likely exist in the absence of a political order. The 
perplexity highlights the centrality of the "duality of human existence" for collective action 
(Durkheim, 1973, pp. 149-166), accounting for the predominance of political society in pre-
modern social formations, notably the fundamental contrast between the public realm of the 
polis and the private realm of economic activities in Greek city-states (Macintyre, 1984; 
Arendt, 1954, p. 12f). Seen from this perspective, the primacy of justice presupposes what 
Arendt has characterized as "the rise of the social" (Arendt, 1954, p. 38f) --the elevation of 
the private realm of labor into the public realm or, more simply, the institutionalization of 
private people's public use of reason (Habermas, 1989). Framed as such, the "social" or civil 
society assumes the possibility that private people can reason publicly. The question, of 
course, is how this is possible. 
This perplexity allows us to understand why the Kantian notion of moral autonomy or 
similar constructs about bourgeois subjectivity has been so centrally important to the se1f-
understanding of the modem West. According to this deontological view of the modem 
se1fhood, the bourgeois as the privatized individual is actually two things in one: bourgeois 
and homme. On the one hand, the bourgeois as the owner of goods is profoundly caught up in 
the requirements of the market and thus subject to empirical inclinations. On the other hand, 
however, the bourgeois as human being is the subject of pure interiority that follows its own 
laws and not any external purpose. This peculiar human subjectivity promises liberation from 
the constraints of what exists, whether it refers to the prescription of culture or the necessity 
oflife (Habermas, 1989, p. 55). For this reason, the split between the bourgeois public sphere 
and the market place, which is constitutive of the bourgeois "social" in the West, is best 
analyzed as the institutional expression of bourgeois subjectivity--i.e., the duality of the 
bourgeois personality. 
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It is noteworthy how global uneven development seems to have counter affirmed but 
at the same time reaffirmed the liberal paradigm of the "social." While the prevalence of 
capitalist deformation across the peripheral world has called into question the liberal claim to 
the priority of bourgeois subjectivity and thus confirmed the Hegelian assertion on the 
primacy of political society for public life, the same phenomenon-- simply by being a 
distinctively peripheral occurrence-has, simultaneously and paradoxically, underscored the 
decisive role of the bourgeois class in the formation and reproduction of Western democratic 
societies. 
This paradox accounts for the ever-lasting sway of the Weberian civilizational 
analysis over theoretical analyses of the modem world order. In his famous comparative 
studies on the "economic ethics" of the Chinese, Indian, Hebrew, and Protestant civilizations, 
Weber conceded that liberal democracy, defined as a polity on the basis of a consensual 
contract among autonomous, rights-bearing individuals, may provide little solution to the 
dilemma of collective action characteristic of a market society. It does not follow, however, 
that the Kantian theses on the primacy of justice and moral autonomy are purely 
philosophical speculations. Rather, they are abstract reflections on the concrete cultural and 
political processes in the historical development of the Occident civilization. Kant is 
certainly right in asserting that the cognitive evolution from substantive rationality to 
formalistic rationality, from the primacy of the ethical life to the primacy of justice holds a 
key to the emergence of legal domination and rational capitalism in the West. What Kant has 
overlooked is the fact that such an evolutionary process is itself rooted primarily in the 
particularity of the religious or cultural orientation of the Occidental civilization and, 
therefore, is historically contingent and culturally specific. It is these unique cultural traits 
that account for the predominance of civic norms and networks of civic engagement in 
Western core countries, which breed and sustain "an individualistic ethics of conscience and 
responsibility" and hence the practice of public reasoning by private people (Ingram, 1987, p. 
45; Schluchter, 1981, p. 62f; Putnam, 1993). By contrast, the absence of such civic roots in 
non-Western societies would create a kind of "uncivic" capitalist system in which 
"[d]efection, distrust, shirking, exploitation, isolation, disorder, and stagnation intensify one 
another in a suffocating miasma of vicious circles" (Putnam, 1993, p. 177). In this setting 
one should only expect a Hobbesian or Hegelian solution, which compensates for 
instabilities through authoritarian institutions. 
The whole point of Weberianism is that, precisely because the transition from 
political society to civil society as anticipated by classical theorists is normally impossible, 
the developmental history of the West must have arisen out of certain religio-cultural 
contingencies unique to the Occidental civilization, which alone may breed the crucial 
precondition for the public reorientation of private wealth- bourgeois subjectivity. 
In view of the increasing salience of cultural conflicts in the post-Cold War era, it is 
hardly surprising the Weberian civilizational scheme has made its dramatic return in recent 
years. The most visible concretization of this neo-Weberian surge is Huntington's "Clash of 
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Civilizations" thesis. "Western concepts," according to Huntington, differ fundamentally 
from those prevalent in other civilizations. Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, 
constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, 
the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, 
Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures" (Huntington, 1993). For this reason, 
peripheral modernization and Westernization cannot but be entirely distinct. The enhanced 
resources brought about by Third World modernization are thus put at the disposal of a 
political agenda hostile to the West (Huntington, 1996, p. 20). The great divisions among 
humankind and the dominating source of conflict in the 21st century, accordingly, will be 
cultural or civilizational. 
The rise of neo-W eberianism brings into sharp focus the fundamental limits of 
peripheral nationalism in general and the "postcolonial" discourse in particular (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000; Dirlik, 1997). The peripheral and post-colonialist accentuation on the politics of 
difference bears a striking resemblance to the Weberian scheme of civilizational politics. By 
characterizing the values of liberal democracy as Western dominant "epistemes" and 
subaltern nationalism as the site ofliberation from Western domination, postcolonial theories 
in fact coincide and even unwittingly reinforce the Weberian assertion that only the 
Occidental civilization is privileged to and therefore deserves the ideal of justice as the basic 
structure of society. In so doing, these theories have the effect of actually endorsing the 
global hierarchical order, within which only the countries of the First World may afford to 
harmonize their national interests with the norms that define the universalistic, cosmopolitan 
aspirations of the United Nations. 
This fundamental convergence is of vital importance for our understanding of the 
present state of global politics. It indicates that peripheral nationalism and Eurocentricism 
tend to reinforce and intensify each other in a vicious spiral, pushing the West and the rest of 
the world to inevitable collision, as is evidenced in the post-9/11 world. Almost overnight, 
the neo-Weberian thesis of the clash of civilizations has replaced the "end of history" scheme 
to become the focal point of political imaginations in "the new wartime era.,,3 
This thesis leads logically to the idea and practice of liberal imperialism or "the 
liberal empire," which finds its clearest and most unabashed expression in Niall Ferguson's 
recent book "America's Empire" (Ferguson, 2004; also see Harris, 2004). Underlying the 
rapid growth of cultural assertiveness and "terrorist" organizations in the non-Western world, 
observes Ferguson, is the prevalent and persistent failure of nation building in peripheral 
countries (ibid., p. 24). By this term, he refers to the failure to create and maintain "the 
institutional foundations without which markets cannot function--peace and order, the rule 
of law, non-corrupt administration, stable fiscal and monetary policies" (ibid., p. 2). This 
explains why, contrary to the triumphalism of the "end of history" theory, capitalism and 
democracy are not naturally occurring (ibid., p. 300). What is required today, therefore, is 
3 Patrick Healy, "Harvard scholar's '96 book becomes the word on war." The Boston Globe, 
November 11,2001. 
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"the imposition of some kind of external authority" (ibid.), namely, a liberal empire that has 
the willingness and ability to do what peripheral countries cannot do on their own---create 
and uphold a liberal political order. "The proper role of an imperial America," accordingly, 
"is to establish these institutions where they are lacking, if necessary, by military force" 
(ibid., p. 300; emphasis added). 
There is little doubt that "the liberal empire" is bound to invoke an even more 
powerful anti-Western surge in the peripheral world, thereby making the 2pt century a 
prisoner of "the clash of civilizations." 
These developments demonstrate clearly that the only solution to the deepening crises 
of globalization lies in the possibility of equal development. In so doing, they bring the 
problematic of peripheral justice, defined as the equal attainment of social justice, to the 
center of current debates on globalization (see Chen, 2005, forthcoming). Specifically, they 
force us to directly confront the toughest challenge posed by the Weberian tradition: If the 
principles of justice and equality are beyond the peculiarity of the Occidental civilization, 
how then may we give a full explanation as to why in the West-and only in the West--the 
ideal of public reasoning by private people has been materialized? 
The Liberal Logic of Eurocentricism 
At the heart of the problematic of peripheral justice is a virtually logical linkage 
between the liberal paradigm of the "social" and the Eurocentric perspective. This liberal 
logic of Eurocentricism can be succinctly stated as follows: Given the pivotal role of the 
Occidental bourgeoisie in the rise of the "social" and given the historical contingency of this 
class, one may expect a permanent disparity between the Kantian West and the Hegelian 
East. 
A revealing illustration of the effect of this liberal logic of Eurocentricism is in 
Habermas' theory of communicative action (see Chen, 2005). The theory represents arguably 
the most systematic effort in the liberal tradition to demonstrate that the process of 
rationalization described by Weber is beyond the peculiarity of the Occidental civilization 
and "lays claim to a universal binding on all "civilized men'" (Habermas, 1984, p. 184). The 
rise of "modem structures of consciousness" in the West, which for Habermas holds the key 
to the formation of the bourgeois public sphere, is to be explained in terms of the 
replacement of traditional forms of the ethical life by the unavoidable pragmatic 
presuppositions of speech and argumentation (Habermas, 1990, p. 170). As these 
presuppositions of communicative action constitute the very discursive conditions for any 
mode of social formation, modem moral consciousness rooted in them can be characterized 
as the self-consciousness of the universalistic properties of human communication and 
thereby transcends the limits of any system of cultural givens. Habermas, however, has never 
succeeded in explaining why it is the case that the same process of "de-ethicalization" has 
led to the "moralization" of the social world in the West but only become the very raison 
d'etre of de-moralization anywhere else. 
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Even more revealing, however, is the effect of the liberal logic of Eurocentricism on 
communitarian theories. Contemporary neo-Hegelians, such as Michael Sandel and Alasdair 
MacIntyre, are certainly right in arguing that the liberal assumption of moral autonomy is 
illusory and can hardly work anywhere. As Sandel observes, the liberal notion of the moral 
self, which is presumably freed "from the dictates of nature and the sanction of social roles," 
is conceptually inconsistent and practically infeasible (Sandel, 1982, p. 177). On the one 
hand, the asserted moral self is bound up with a vision of the moral universe this self must 
inhabit in order to free itself from the dictates of nature; on the other hand, unlike classical 
Greek and medieval Christian conceptions, the universe of the deontological ethic must be 
conceived of as "a world without an objective moral order" (ibid., p. 175). Yet, to imagine a 
person devoid of attachments and commitments is not to conceive an ideally free and rational 
agent capable of public reasoning, "but to imagine a person wholly without character, 
without moral depth"-in other words, a person totally at the mercy of the dictates of nature 
(ibid., p. 179). 
The difficulty with neo-Hegelians, however, is that their insistence on the primacy of 
the ethical life for any social formation makes it virtually impossible to explain the de facto 
presence of liberal modernity in the West. How, after all, can we conceptualize the 
distinction between the political and the "social" without resorting to the ethics/morality 
polarity? 
Not surprisingly, when forced to explain the dynamics of autonomous public life in 
modem Western societies, neo-Hegelians have little choice but to tacitly embrace the liberal 
presumption of moral autonomy by simply characterizing it as "a democratic form of ethical 
life (Taylor, 1989; Wellmer, 1990, pp. 235-6).4 What is unique to the modem West, thus 
Taylor advised us, is "the modem identity" (or "the modem inward tum") that is grounded in 
the principle of respect in terms of "rights" and characterized by "the affirmation of ordinary 
life" (Taylor, 1989, pp. 11-13). In this regard, "the modem selthood" buttresses "the 
institutionalization of an equalitarian order," thereby contrasting starkly with the "traditional, 
Aristotelian ethics" (We1lmer, 1990; Taylor, 1989, pp. 11-13). Some have even gone so far 
as to suggest that liberalism "has constituted itself as a tradition precisely by creating its own 
normativity out of itself' (Kelly, 1990, p. 71). In this sense, liberal modernity is also 
tradition-bound. 
This is only a short step from the development of a full account of how, thanks to the 
emergence of "an unprecedented form of self-governing" in late medieval Europe, the West 
4 From this perspective, modem identity and bourgeois institutions of self-government derives from "a 
modem, Christian-inspired sense," which places ordinary life at "the very center of the good life" and 
accordingly comes to acquire "civic virtues" or "civic mores" essential to self-rule (Taylor, 1989, p. 13). "To 
share in self-rule therefore requires that citizens possess, or come to acquire certain qualities of character, or 
civic virtues. But this means that republican politics cannot be neutral towards the values and ends its citizens 
espouse. The republican conception of freedom, unlike the liberal conception, requires a formative politics, a 
politics that cultivates in citizens the qualities of character self-government requires" (Sandel, 1996, pp. 5-6; 
emphasis mine). 
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has acquired its defining feature--"the civic tradition" or the civic way of life, which is 
marked by devotion to public affairs (Putnam, 1993, p. 87) and "a steady recognition and 
pursuit of the public good at the expense of all purely individual and private ends" (Walzer, 
1980, p. 64). It follows that, in the non-Western world where the norms and networks of 
civic engagement are lacking, the outlook for autonomous public life cannot but be bleak 
(Putnam, 1993, p. 183). The fate of each nation in the modem world, therefore, was sealed 
centuries ago, if not earlier (ibid.). 
The Liberal Self versus the Public Ethical 
In view of the intrinsic linkage between liberalism and Eurocentricism, it becomes 
obvious that no solution to the problematic of peripheral justice would be possible without 
seriously questioning the validity of the liberal paradigm of the "social," even if it is taken 
only as a self-interpretation of the West. In other words, a theory of peripheral justice must 
start with the assumption that the rise of the "social" is independent of and prior to the 
historical contingency of the bourgeois class. Clearly, such a new conception of the "social" 
is possible only when two crucial conditions are met. First, the rise of the "social" does not 
presuppose the role of class subjectivity or any mode of "modem structures of 
consciousness." Second, the self-activity of the Western bourgeoisie is actually the effect of 
the public reorientation of social labor rather than its cause. In other words, it must be 
assumed that the liberal paradigm of the "social" is an illusory self-interpretation of the 
West, which simply cannot work anywhere, East or West. 
These formidable challenges provide us with an appropriate framework for assessing 
the significance of the Marxist theory of public hegemony, which was developed 
respectively by Chinese Confucian Marxists (Liu, 1939) and Antonio Gramsci (1971).5 
Central to this theory is the development of an "ethical" conception of the "social" that 
denies any significance to the role of private autonomy in the public reorientation of material 
production, representing a radical inversion of the relationship between class and the "social" 
in the liberal paradigm. In this view, the real source of autonomous public life lies in the 
ethical substance of traditional political society. The elevation of social labor into the public 
realm, therefore, is to be understood as a historical process through which the laboring 
masses re-appropriate the ethical-public sphere of political society. For this reason, the 
"social" is to be conceptualized as public hegemony or the public ethical. 
The starting point of this "ethical" conception of the "social" is a radical 
reinterpretation of Marx's analysis of social reproduction. In sharp contrast to a variety of 
"dominant ideology" or "common culture" theories that have dominated theoretical analyses 
of culture and state power ever since Marx (Abercrombie et aI., 1980), public hegemony 
theorists identify the mechanism of hegemony by cultural differentiation as the key to · the 
analysis of the role of the State in social reproduction in traditional political societies. In this 
5 For more detailed discussions of this important Marxist theoretical tradition and its implications for 
global politics today, see Chen 2005, forthcoming. 
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view, the reliance of material production on the State for its reproduction in these societies 
arises precisely from a fixed differentiation between social and political reproduction, 
between structural and symbolic integration. The domination of the State over the toiling 
masses is achieved through a deliberate creation of "symbolic isolation" of the masses. In 
other words, it is achieved by a deliberate effort to prevent popular masses from becoming 
"subjects" or "public selves." Once political reproduction is secured through the role of the 
ruling elites as carriers of the ethical (i.e., cultivation), the structural submission of 
production strata to the public authority would follow. In this sense, the monopoly of 
symbolic integration (i.e., the ethical sphere) by the ruling group constitutes the basis of its 
symbolic power, which in turn paves the way to its access to political and economic power 
(Liu, 1939; Gramsci, 1971). 
The rise of the social, from this perspective, is to be defined as the private realm's 
appropriation of the ethical content (the ethico-political sphere) of the State, which is now 
estranged from the State and assumes its own existence in "traditional intellectuals" and 
"classical education." For this reason, the "civilized" nature or the autonomy of civil society 
is best understood as the result of a historically unprecedented development: the direct 
integration of the ethico-political sphere into the private realm of labor. The key to the 
successful transition from natural society to civil society, therefore, lies in two historical 
processes: the split between the ethical content (hegemony) and the "political society" within 
the ethical State per se and the subsequent appropriation of the former by the private terrain. 
"Civil society," accordingly, is to be conceived as the ethico-political sphere in the private 
realm of labor. It is in this sense that Gramsci suggests to redefine civil society as "civil 
hegemony" or "the image of a State without a State" (Gramsci, 1971, p. 263). 
In this connection, bourgeois civil society is to be analyzed as a specific form of 
public hegemony. The assimilation of the ethico-political sphere into the sphere of the 
production of material life, in this view, holds the key to the secret of bourgeois subjectivity. 
This process not only explains why the private realm began to assume public significance in 
the early modem Europe; even more significantly, it also allows us to specify the very 
conditions under which the European bourgeoisie as a modern class was born. The 
appropriation of the ethico-political sphere by private sectors had been made in such a 
fashion that the sphere became the private property of the dominant economic grouping, cut 
off from the rest of society. Public hegemony was thus transposed to the subculture of the 
dominant economic group, under the guise of its "internal" or "intimate space." 
By radically reversing the liberal account of the relationship between class and the 
"social" and redefining bourgeois subjectivity as the result of the bourgeoisie's monopoly of 
the ethical, the theory of public hegemony suggests that bourgeois democracy is best viewed 
as a "civic" mode of domination by cultural differentiation. 
The significance of this distinctive approach to bourgeois democracy can hardly be 
overestimated. It carries a number of implications that are of paramount importance for 
theoretical attempts to address the problematic of peripheral justice. Since the dual role of the 
bourgeois class (as the carrier of both praxis and labor) results from the appropriation of the 
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ethical domain by the realm of labor as well as the bourgeoisie's monopoly of the ethical as 
its subculture, the sub society of the dominant economic group constitutes the de facto 
institutional base for the formation of the public of private people in Western democratic 
societies. What is characteristic of bourgeois publicity, then, is a structural split within 
bourgeois society between, on the one hand, the private ethical as the institutional base of 
public reasoning and, on the other, and the bourgeois public sphere as the manifestation of 
bourgeois publicity. 
This split is essential to our understanding of global uneven development on two 
counts. Firstly, it suggests that ethnic differentiation is in fact rooted in the very nature of 
bourgeois domination and constitutes an essential component of Western democratic 
societies. Due to the monopoly of the dominant culture by the bourgeoisie and the 
subsequent structural split between the mainstream liberal culture and the dominant 
(sub )culture, acculturation or the assimilation of minorities into the mainstream culture 
becomes one of the most effective mechanisms through which the symbolic isolation of 
laboring masses from the dominant culture is created and the submission of non-bourgeois 
laborers to bourgeois domination is secured. 
Secondly, the split allows us to discern how the mechanism of symbolic isolation 
through assimilation, which holds the key to civic ethnicity, has been used by European 
powers to systematically create the core/periphery disparities at the global level. As in the 
case of minority groups, the more a non-Western nation incorporates itself into the global 
culture ofliberal democracy, the more it is symbolically isolated from the very culture of the 
Western bourgeoisie that is actually the dominant culture of the capitalist world order, the 
more it is marginalized within the world order, and the more it is condemned for its 
"Oriental" traits. In this sense, uneven development can be properly characterized as a global 
expansion of racial disparities within the capitalist core. The solution to the problematic of 
peripheral justice, accordingly, lies in the possibility of constructing a public-ethical sphere 
or what Gramsci terms "the public ethical State" that will serve as a school of "State life," in 
which "each non-ruler" is ensured a free training in the skills necessary for governing" 
(Gramsci, 1971, p. 268). 
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